Book-Project 

Emotion and Coercive Credibility in International Crises

Prevailing accounts in International Relations suggest that a threat’s credibility is shaped by the structure of countries that make threats, such as regime type, party politics, and power. However, there is substantial variation among structurally similar countries and among leaders within the same country. My book project addresses this question by offering a new theory that leaders’ anger expressions systematically influence the credibility of threat threats. I provide empirical evidence for this theory using a combination of text-as-data and experimental approaches. I built a dataset of world leaders' anger expressions and threats contained in public statements made in international crises between 1946-1996.  I show that threats are more effective when they are accompanied by anger, and and that this effect is mediated by perceptions of insensitivity to the cost of conflict.

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Yoon, Hohyun. "Anger Expressions and Coercive Credibility in International Crises." Accepted for publication at American Journal of Political Science.

• Abstract: Why are some threats more credible than others? I argue that leaders’ anger expressions are a previously underappreciated source of coercive credibility. Specifically, leaders who express anger appear more credible because targets believe they are less sensitive to the costs of conflict. I test this argument through quantitative analysis of a novel dataset of world leaders’ public statement in crises from 1946-1996 and a U.S.-based survey experiment designed to test the mechanism. The observational evidence reveals that anger expressions increase the likelihood a threat will succeed. The experiment shows that anger expressions cause targets to infer greater resolve and that non-angry threats carry little credibility—and might even backfire. These findings not only shed light on a unique source of threat credibility but also highlight the crucial role of emotions in international relations with new data measuring political leaders’ emotional expressions over time and space.

McWard, Andrew C, and Hohyun Yoon. 2023. "Preventing Coups and Seeking Allies: The Demand and Supply of Alliances for Coup-Proofing Regimes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution.

• Abstract: Prevailing accounts of alliance formation emphasize either external threats or domestic politics, without an explicit consideration of how the two factors might interact. Instead, this paper theorizes about a specific type of interaction: coup-prevention strategies in nondemocratic regimes and external threats. Through quantitative analyses using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the State Security Forces (SSF) data, we find that “coup-proofing” reduces the probability of alliance formation when potential allies are under high external threat and that this effect is driven by the coup-proofing regime’s reduced capability to defend their allies, rather than the regime’s increased vulnerability to aggression. Furthermore, we find evidence for the interactive relationship at the negotiation stage of alliance formation. Upon entering an alliance, a coup-proofing regime facing a higher level of external threat offers more policy concessions to the ally, whereas an ally under higher threat could make fewer concessions to the coup-proofing regime. Our study highlights the way nondemocratic domestic political institutions can interact with external threat to shape states’ alliance behavior.

• Replication files