Book-Project Dissertation

“Emotion and Threat Credibility: The Strategic Role of Anger in International Crises”

Prevailing accounts in International Relations suggest that a threat’s credibility is shaped by the structure of countries that make threats, such as regime type, party politics, and power. However, there is substantial variation among structurally similar countries and among leaders within the same country. My book project addresses this question by offering a new theory that leaders’ anger expressions systematically influence the credibility of threat threats. I provide empirical evidence for this theory using a combination of text-as-data and experimental approaches. I built a dataset of world leaders' anger expressions and threats contained in public statements made in international crises between 1946-1996.  I show that threats are more effective when they are accompanied by anger, and and that this effect is mediated by perceptions of insensitivity to the cost of conflict.

Peer-Reviewed Publications

† Graduate student coauthor

McWard, Andrew C†, and Hohyun Yoon. 2023. "Preventing Coups and Seeking Allies: The Demand and Supply of Alliances for Coup-Proofing Regimes.” Forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution.

• Abstract: Prevailing accounts of alliance formation emphasize either external threats or domestic politics, without an explicit consideration of how the two factors might interact. Instead, this paper theorizes about a specific type of interaction: coup-prevention strategies in nondemocratic regimes and external threats. Through quantitative analyses using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the State Security Forces (SSF) data, we find that “coup-proofing” reduces the probability of alliance formation when potential allies are under high external threat and that this effect is driven by the coup-proofing regime’s reduced capability to defend their allies, rather than the regime’s increased vulnerability to aggression. Furthermore, we find evidence for the interactive relationship at the negotiation stage of alliance formation. Upon entering an alliance, a coup-proofing regime facing a higher level of external threat offers more policy concessions to the ally, whereas an ally under higher threat could make fewer concessions to the coup-proofing regime. Our study highlights the way nondemocratic domestic political institutions can interact with external threat to shape states’ alliance behavior.

• Replication files

Work in progress

Yoon, Hohyun. "Getting Angry, Winning Crises: Anger Expressions and Threat Credibility in International Crises."

Yoon, Hohyun. "Anger, Audience Costs, and Signaling in International Crises."

Yoon, Hohyun. "Emotion Communications and Beliefs about Resolve."

Park, Yumi, and Hohyun Yoon. "A Behavioral Theory of Reputation for Cooperation."

Yoon, Hohyun, Jessica LP Weeks, and Michaela Mattes. "Wartime Negotiation Behavior and Third-Party Public Support."